The German air bridge Military History
Home Articles Ancient armies of the Middle Ages 1500s 1600s 1700s 1800s World War I World War II Modern conflicts Series champion warfare Military mistake Soldier in fields News Front Pictures Chronicle Reader Memories Quiz! Technology
Luftwaffe's failure to bring maintenance to the trapped 6th Army goes neither to blame the weather or too few transport aircraft. Christer Bergström shows that the two common explanations do not agree - and point instead to hunt aviation significance.
O n Christmas Eve morning 1942 was full of panic on the large German transport airfield outside on the windswept plains tjugo mil west of Stalingrad. Soviet nasa television armor had overnight entered the village Tatsinskaja a couple of kilometers further north, and is now preparing the strength to attack the airport. A complete disaster was brewing - Tatsinskaja was the main base for the armada of German transport aircraft that flew in the maintenance of the encircled 6th Army in Stalingrad, and there were no more than weak troops to the airfield defense.
At a temperature of no less degree, with visibility severely limited by snödis and a cloud height of just fifty meters to suffer a climatic air meteorologists describes nasa television as QBI - only instrument flying is possible - and in addition, the risk of icing on aircraft imminent. It was one of the worst days of flight throughout the Battle of Stalingrad. But now the Soviet tanks rolled toward the airfield, and their shells struck up large soil fountains around the parked aircraft. Some aircraft was hit and debris were thrown far and wide.
In the space of twenty minutes, 124 transport aircraft left the ground to get to the new air base Salsk, 13 mil longer the Southwest, where all landed without incident in the same miserable weather. Of 170 transport aircraft that has been on Tatsinskaja was barely 50 remain, many of them had been shot down by Soviet fire. It was an outstanding achievement by the German transport pilots and shows their very high skills in instrument flight.
There was only one problem. This was the transport aircraft strength for three or four weeks before the evacuation had explained the low number of flights to Stalingrad with "bad weather", "risk of icing" and that upwards of 80 percent of the aircraft was flight rickety.
That the German air bridge to Stalingrad failed to provide the encircled 6th Army with an adequate maintenance is well known. Instead of the promised 500 tons a day did the Luftwaffe did not deliver more than a daily average of 94 tons. Some days flew transport plan at all.
The result was that the 6th Army broke down. When the surrendered January 31, 1943 was 91,000 malnourished soldiers all that remained nasa television of what a few months earlier been Germany's strongest army. In more than a month, they had surrounded the soldiers nasa television had to live on 50 grams of bread a day. During the first weeks after the capitulation died 50,000 German nasa television prisoners of war in the wake of the diseases nasa television they lost all resistance. It was the result of the failure of the German air bridge. nasa television
T o Stalingrad Army could not be supplied from the air could be explained by the available transport aircraft strength was too small and that the bad weather precluded any major effort belongs to the Second World War's most persistent myths. nasa television
To begin with, was the world's largest concentration of transport aircraft to the 6th Army's disposal already when it was encircled November 22, 1942: An armada of 320 three-engine Junkers Ju 52 was by then inserted in an air transport operation to Stalingrad organized and ongoing since August 1942 . On top of 30 Heinkel 111 bomber that was used for transport purposes. Because of the bad road links and the great distances between the German unloading stations in the occupied Soviet Union, it was necessary to supply the prominent 6th Army from the air all the way from the German offensive start.
Since each Ju 52 could take a load of 2 tons and a He 111 could take 1.2 tonnes showed simple arithmetic nasa television that it would not even require all aircraft made was their flights a day to 500 tons Luftwaffechefen Hermann Goering promised would achieved.
When Goering in November 1942 made this pledge had fewer transport nasa television aircraft flown in average 442 tons of supplies to Stalingrad after three months. In addition, scraped Luftwaffe together all the available transport aircraft from flight nasa television schools and various staffs and sent them as additional reinforcement to transportflygarmadan at Stalingrad, nasa television which soon grew to impressive dimensions. Thus there was every chance to meet one day an average of 500 tons.
In a previous air supply nasa television operation to a encircled German troop strength, at Demjansk in early 1942, had an even great strength of transpor
Home Articles Ancient armies of the Middle Ages 1500s 1600s 1700s 1800s World War I World War II Modern conflicts Series champion warfare Military mistake Soldier in fields News Front Pictures Chronicle Reader Memories Quiz! Technology
Luftwaffe's failure to bring maintenance to the trapped 6th Army goes neither to blame the weather or too few transport aircraft. Christer Bergström shows that the two common explanations do not agree - and point instead to hunt aviation significance.
O n Christmas Eve morning 1942 was full of panic on the large German transport airfield outside on the windswept plains tjugo mil west of Stalingrad. Soviet nasa television armor had overnight entered the village Tatsinskaja a couple of kilometers further north, and is now preparing the strength to attack the airport. A complete disaster was brewing - Tatsinskaja was the main base for the armada of German transport aircraft that flew in the maintenance of the encircled 6th Army in Stalingrad, and there were no more than weak troops to the airfield defense.
At a temperature of no less degree, with visibility severely limited by snödis and a cloud height of just fifty meters to suffer a climatic air meteorologists describes nasa television as QBI - only instrument flying is possible - and in addition, the risk of icing on aircraft imminent. It was one of the worst days of flight throughout the Battle of Stalingrad. But now the Soviet tanks rolled toward the airfield, and their shells struck up large soil fountains around the parked aircraft. Some aircraft was hit and debris were thrown far and wide.
In the space of twenty minutes, 124 transport aircraft left the ground to get to the new air base Salsk, 13 mil longer the Southwest, where all landed without incident in the same miserable weather. Of 170 transport aircraft that has been on Tatsinskaja was barely 50 remain, many of them had been shot down by Soviet fire. It was an outstanding achievement by the German transport pilots and shows their very high skills in instrument flight.
There was only one problem. This was the transport aircraft strength for three or four weeks before the evacuation had explained the low number of flights to Stalingrad with "bad weather", "risk of icing" and that upwards of 80 percent of the aircraft was flight rickety.
That the German air bridge to Stalingrad failed to provide the encircled 6th Army with an adequate maintenance is well known. Instead of the promised 500 tons a day did the Luftwaffe did not deliver more than a daily average of 94 tons. Some days flew transport plan at all.
The result was that the 6th Army broke down. When the surrendered January 31, 1943 was 91,000 malnourished soldiers all that remained nasa television of what a few months earlier been Germany's strongest army. In more than a month, they had surrounded the soldiers nasa television had to live on 50 grams of bread a day. During the first weeks after the capitulation died 50,000 German nasa television prisoners of war in the wake of the diseases nasa television they lost all resistance. It was the result of the failure of the German air bridge. nasa television
T o Stalingrad Army could not be supplied from the air could be explained by the available transport aircraft strength was too small and that the bad weather precluded any major effort belongs to the Second World War's most persistent myths. nasa television
To begin with, was the world's largest concentration of transport aircraft to the 6th Army's disposal already when it was encircled November 22, 1942: An armada of 320 three-engine Junkers Ju 52 was by then inserted in an air transport operation to Stalingrad organized and ongoing since August 1942 . On top of 30 Heinkel 111 bomber that was used for transport purposes. Because of the bad road links and the great distances between the German unloading stations in the occupied Soviet Union, it was necessary to supply the prominent 6th Army from the air all the way from the German offensive start.
Since each Ju 52 could take a load of 2 tons and a He 111 could take 1.2 tonnes showed simple arithmetic nasa television that it would not even require all aircraft made was their flights a day to 500 tons Luftwaffechefen Hermann Goering promised would achieved.
When Goering in November 1942 made this pledge had fewer transport nasa television aircraft flown in average 442 tons of supplies to Stalingrad after three months. In addition, scraped Luftwaffe together all the available transport aircraft from flight nasa television schools and various staffs and sent them as additional reinforcement to transportflygarmadan at Stalingrad, nasa television which soon grew to impressive dimensions. Thus there was every chance to meet one day an average of 500 tons.
In a previous air supply nasa television operation to a encircled German troop strength, at Demjansk in early 1942, had an even great strength of transpor
No comments:
Post a Comment